

Message Text

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FOR ICA/NEA INFO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (SAUNDERS, HAROLD)

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS BACKGROUND BRIEFING
TO ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS

BEGIN TEXT:

1. FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SAUNDERS GAVE TO ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON
JULY 13. ATTRIBUTION IS "TO U.S. OFFICIALS."

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LET ME SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT LONDON. WE'RE GLAD THAT CONTACTS IN THIS FORM ARE RECONVENING. WE WELCOME CONTACTS IN ANY FORM. WE'RE PARTICULARLY HAPPY WHEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS GET TOGETHER ON THEIR OWN, BUT THERE SEEMS TO BE VALUE IN RECONVENING THEM IN THIS PARTICULAR FORUM. WE HOPE TO HAVE GOOD, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT EACH SIDE TO PROBE THE THINKING BEHIND EACH OTHER'S APPROACHES TO THE WEST BANK/GAZA PROBLEMS. SECOND, WE HOPE THAT OUT OF THIS WOULD COME SOME UNDERSTANDING ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATIONS. SO IN LONDON

THERE ARE TWO SETS OF CONCERNS. ONE, THERE'S THE SUB-STANTIVE CONCERN IN ADVANCING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECOND IS THE PROCEDURAL CONCERN OF ESTABLISHING THE WAY TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. WE DON'T EXPECT A NEW AGREEMENT OR A NEW PAPER TO COME OUT OF LONDON. IT'S NOT A MEETING FROM

WHICH ONE EXPECTS SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS IN A SENSE OF THERE BEING A NEW AGREEMENT. WHAT WE DO EXPECT IS THAT BOTH SUBSTANTIALLY AND PROCEDURALLY LONDON CAN PROVIDE A START-ING POINT FOR ANOTHER SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Q. SPECIFICALLY HOW DOES THE MEETING BETWEEN WEIZMAN, SA-DAT AND GAMASY FIT INTO THE PICTURE?

A. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THIS TRACK, AS YOU WELL KNOW, STARTING WITH THE MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COMMITTEE AND THE SEVERAL MEETINGS THE DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE HAD. THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, SINCE JANUARY, DIRECT COMMUNICA-TIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO SET UP THOSE MEETINGS SO THIS MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED ON THAT OTHER TRACK AND THEREFORE TECHNICALLY IS APART FROM THE TRACK THAT WE'RE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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REVIVING IN LONDON. ANY NEGOTIATION ON ANY TRACK IS PART OF THE WHOLE PICTURE AND I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WEIZMAN AND GAMASY OR WEIZMAN AND SADAT WILL BE TALKING ABOUT THERE. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT ANY CONVERSATIONS AT THAT LEVEL ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND HAVE TO MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO ADVANCING THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WHAT WE'RE DOING IN LONDON I THINK IS A RATHER SPECIAL JOB. AS YOU RECALL WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGAN IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN JANUARY WHERE WE'VE MOVE THROUGH DISCUSSIONS OF A DECLARA-TION OF PRINCIPLES TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WE HAVE GOTTEN DOWN TO DETAILED DIS-CUSSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BECAUSE WE'VE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO GO INTO SOME DEPTH ON ESE SUBJECTS AS YOUR PRIME MINISTER RIGHTLY SAID, IF YOU ARE GOING TO AGREE ON A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, YOU HAVE TO KNOW WHAT FOLLOWS FROM IT. AND THEREFORE WE ALWAYS KNEW THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR THIS AND YOUR PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED IT WHEN THEY ADVANCED THE SELF RULE PLAN. SO THE LONDON TALKS WILL FOCUS LARGEMLY ON THAT COLLECTION OF PROBLEMS. THERE IS OF COURSE THE OTHER TRACK OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS GOING ON ENTIRELY APART FROM THE TRAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO LONDON, BUT OF COURSE THEY ARE ALL PART OF THE WHOLE PICTURE.

Q. DID THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH GETTING

THIS MEETING TODAY ARRANGED?

A. NO, WE DID NOT.

Q. DID YOU KNOW ABOUT IT?

A. WE WERE INFORMED WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS THAT IT WAS GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND WE WERE LITERALLY INFORMED.

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Q. WERE YOU SURPRISED?

A. I'M CERTAINLY SURPRISED, YES. I THINK THAT'S PROBABLY THE WAY TO PUT IT. WE ARE DELIGHTED WHEN THESE THINGS HAPPEN. WE, OF COURSE, HAD TALKED WITH BOTH SIDES DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO ISRAEL ABOUT OUR HOPES THAT ANOTHER WEIZMAN-GAMASY MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND AS YOU WILL RECALL THERE WERE EXCHANGES GOING ON BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY AT THAT TIME. WE'VE NOT INTERFERED IN THAT LINE OF COMMUNICATION AT ALL. SO, IT DOESN'T SURPRISE US OR BOTHER US THAT THIS MEETING WAS ARRANGED AND THAT WE WERE INFORMED ABOUT IT WHEN IT WAS ARRANGED. THAT'S FINE - THAT'S DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT THEIR BEST AND WE APPLAUD THAT.

Q. WHAT POSSIBLY COULD FOLLOW THE LONDON MEETING?

A. WELL, I THINK THE COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITIES THAT I CAN LAY OUT WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

FURTHER DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, EITHER IN THE DAYAN-KAMEL OR IN THE WEIZMAN-GAMASY CHANNEL. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT MEETINGS BE ARRANGED ALTERNATELY IN BEER SHEVA AND EL ARISH. SO THAT'S ONE POSSIBILITY.

Q. WHO SUGGESTED BEERSHEVA AND EL ARISH?

A. SADAT HAS HAD THE IDEA OF AN EL ARISH MEETING AND AN ALTERNATE IN BEERSHEVA. THAT'S A POSSIBILITY. THE SECOND ELEMENT THAT'S POSSIBLE -- NONE OF THESE EXCLUDE ANY OF THE OTHERS-IS THAT ROY ATHERTON COULD GO BACK TO THE AREA TO CONTINUE THE SUBSTANTIVE WORK THAT COMES OUT OF THE LONDON MEETING AND KEEP THAT ALIVE. THIRD, THERE'S A POSSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TAKING A TRIP TO

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THE AREA SOMEWHAT LATER TO BUILD ON WHATEVER IS ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS OTHER COMBINATION OF EFFORTS. HOW ALL

THATS PUT TOGETHER WE REALLY CAN'T PRECISELY FORESEE, BUT WE DO ENVISION A PROCESS WHICH INVOLVES MOST OF THOSE (ELEMENTS).

Q. CBS REPORTED A LIKELY EL ARISH MEETING. IS VANCE GOING TO THAT?

A. I REALLY DON'T KNOW. I AM NOT BEING EVASIVE AT ALL AT THIS POINT, BUT WHAT WE CAN'T TELL IS WHAT KIND OF MEETING THAT WOULD BE, WHEN IT WOULD TAKE PLACE, WHETHER IT WOULD BE PRELIMINARY, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING SPECIFIC.

Q. AT THIS POINT THERE'S NO AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO REMOVE THE TALKS TO BEERSHEVA?

A. NO, IT'S JUST AN IDEA THAT I THINK PEOPLE ARE GENERALLY RECEPTIVE TO THAT ARE WAITING FOR LONDON TO CRYSTALLIZE A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WOULD MAKE SENSE. UNTIL WE'VE BEEN TO LONDON WE REALLY WON'T UNDERSTAND QUITE HOW ALL THESE PIECES CAN FIT TOGETHER IN THE MOST USEFUL WAY. IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE SECRETARY, I THINK THE SECRETARY WOULD DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE TALKS, AS LONG AS IT WOULD SEEM TO BE OF A REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT IT WOULD HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

Q. NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE HAS REALLY CHANGED SINCE YOU MADE THE PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS AND A FEW DAYS LATER AMBASSADOR ATHERTON MADE A SPEECH TO CONGRESS. WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO BRING REAL PROGRESS IN THE PEACE EFFORT? ARE THE REACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THEY ARE IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITIONS?

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A. ONE THING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THOSE TWO SPEECHES IS THE VERY THOUGHTFUL SPEECH THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT GAVE IN THE KNESSET BUILDING DURING HIS VISIT THERE AND HE ADDRESSED THE SAME SUBJECT THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE. THE OTHER THING THAT'S HAPPENED SINCE THAT STATEMENT WAS MADE TO THE HAMILTON SUB-COMMITTEE OF COURSE IS THAT WE NOW HAVE THE EGYPTIAN PAPER ON THE TABLE. THAT STATEMENT TO THE HAMILTON SUB-COMMITTEE WAS MY EFFORT TO SAY SOME THINGS ABOUT AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST THAT HAVE A LASTING QUALITY -- THAT ARE NOT GEARED TO THE PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION. WHAT YOU SAW THERE WAS A STATEMENT OF A FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN VIEW, NOT A VIEW GEARED TO ANY TACTICAL SITUATION. I THOUGHT THAT AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND PARTICULARLY IN

THE WAKE OF THE VERY HEATED DEBATE OVER THE AIRCRAFT SALES THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SOMEBODY TO STEP BACK FROM THE DAY-TO-DAY SITUATION AND TRY TO PROVIDE AMERICANS WITH A WAY OF LOOKING AT THE MIDDLE EAST THAT ENCOMPASSED ALL OF OUR INTERESTS THERE. THAT WAS REALLY THE PURPOSE OF THAT STATEMENT. THERE WERE SOME DEEP CONCERNS, AND THERE WERE SOME RATHER NASTY ARGUMENTS DURING THE DEBATE OVER THE AIRCRAFT SALE. I FELT THAT IF WE COULD ALL STEP BACK HERE AND GET THE MIDDLE EAST IN ITS BROADEST POSSIBLE

PERSPECTIVE THAT WE COULD SEE THAT WE COULD PURSUE EACH OF OUR INTERESTS AND OUR COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL AS WELL AS OUR INTERESTS ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITHOUT ANY SACRIFICE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. I WANTED TO GIVE PEOPLE A WAY OF THINKING THAT WOULD LEAVE THEM COMFORTABLE ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING AND ALSO TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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INTEREST OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO MOVE TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN A MEASURED WAY. IT COMES DOWN TO SOME VERY BASIC ISSUES. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE FOR ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM STRENGTH IS THE QUESTION OF SECURITY. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE OTHER HISTORICAL, EMOTIONAL CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT COME INTO PLAY WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THE WEST BANK BUT TO BEGIN WITH THE FIRST PRIORITY OF COURSE IS THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL BE SECURE. OUR QUESTION IS THE QUESTION WE HAVE EXPLORED WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR A LONG TIME -- WHETHER THAT SECURITY CAN BE PROVIDED, APART FROM WHERE YOU DRAW THE LINE.

Q. YOU OUTLINED THREE POSSIBILITIES OF OUTCOMES FROM LONDON. THESE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN SCENARIOS. WHAT WILL LEAD TO THESE SCENARIOS?

A. THOSE THREE DEVELOPMENTS ARE AS I SAID NOT EXCLUSIVE AND PROBABLY WHAT WILL HAPPEN WILL BE SOME COMBINATION OF THEM. WHAT IS REALLY IMPORTANT OUT OF LONDON IS TO JOIN DISCUSSION ON THE TWO PROPOSALS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I DON'T MEAN THAT TECHNICALLY IN THE SENSE OF THE TWO PAPERS ALONE, BUT WHAT I AM TALKING ABOUT IS THE TWO APPROACHES TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA PROBLEM. AS YOU LOOK AT THOSE PAPERS IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACHES. CERTAINLY THERE'S AN AGREEMENT THAT LIES BEHIND THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES, BOTH OF THEM, BUT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE ARE PEACE TREATIES, FINAL PEACE, FULL AND NORMAL RELATIONS. THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT DID NOT HAPPEN TO SPELL THAT OUT, BUT THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT -- LIKE THE PRIME MINISTER'S SELF-RULE PLAN WHICH DIDN'T MENTION THESE ISSUES EITHER --

ASSUMES THAT THEY ARE IN THE OTHER DOCUMENT, IN THE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES, AND THAT'S THE BACKDROP FOR THESE PARTICULAR DOCUMENTS. ANYWAY, THAT ON THE TABLE. I THINK THAT ALSO THERE'S BEEN COMMENT ABOUT THE IDEA OF SOME SORT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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OF TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

IN OTHER WORDS IF WE CAN GET FROM LONDON A DEFINITION OF COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACHES, THEN WE CAN GO ON TO A

SECOND CATEGORY OF ISSUES WHICH ARE DISCUSSED IN BOTH PLANS BUT NOT IN DETAIL AND REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION, PARTICULARLY ON THE SECURITY POINT. THE ISRAELI PLAN ADDRESSES THE SECURITY POINT IN CERTAIN WAYS. THE EGYPTIAN PLAN, IN A LESS ELABORATE WAY, SAYS THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BOTH DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. I THINK THERE OBVIOUSLY COULD BE A VERY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION IN THAT AREA.

Q. WHAT IS GOING TO BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA?

A. WE DO NOT HAVE AN AGENDA, IN THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD. WE ARE TRYING NOT TO MAKE THIS A CONFERENCE. WE WANT IT TO BE A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS -- BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, IN AN INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE. WE DON'T WANT ANY OF THE TRAPPINGS OF THE FORMAL CONFERENCE BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT GETS IN THE WAY OF THE KIND OF DIRECT AND EASY EXCHANGE THAT IS IMPORTANT. WE WANT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO FACILITATE A GENUINE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, WITH US PRESENT OR WITH US NOT PRESENT AS IT SEEMS CONVENIENT TO THE TWO SIDES. I THINK WHAT WE WILL SUGGEST DOING IS STARTING WITH THE TWO PAPERS THAT ARE ON THE TABLE NOW AND AFFORDING EACH SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND ITS APPROACH AND TO ASK THE OTHER SIDE QUESTIONS THAT NEED CLARIFYING AND SO ON, OUT OF THIS EXCHANGE, PERHAPS, TO DEVELOP A FULLER PICTURE OF WHERE THE REAL POINTS OF DIFFICULTY ARE, AND WHERE REAL POINTS OF AGREEMENT MIGHT BE DEVELOPED.

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Q. DO YOU FEEL THAT KAMEL HAS THE CLOUT TO BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THE WELL-KNOWN EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, IN CASE THERE'S OPPORTUNITY? BECAUSE I KNOW THAT BACK IN JANUARY HE'D BEEN FRESH ON THE JOB AND THERE WAS SOME CONCERN WHETHER HE WAS A GOOD OPPOSITE NUMBER FOR DAYAN.

A. WE HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION WITH HIM IN NEW YORK

WHEN THE SECRETARY HAD LUNCH WITH HIM DURING THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT AND OBVIOUSLY AT THAT TIME WE WEREN'T TALKING IN DETAIL ABOUT THIS EGYPTIAN PLAN, BUT TALKING ABOUT

THE PROBLEM. WE FOUND KAMEL QUITE IN COMMAND OF THE ISSUES THAT WERE BEING DISCUSSED AND READY TO DISCUSS THEM IN A QUITE FREE AND OPEN WAY, SO I THINK THAT WE CAN HAVE A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. OBVIOUSLY, BOTH SIDES ARE GOING TO BE OPERATING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF INSTRUCTIONS IMPOSED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND WE WON'T FAULT EITHER SIDE IF THEY CAN ONLY GO UP TO A CERTAIN POINT. AFTER ALL, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS IN A TWO DAY PERIOD THAT, BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF TIME, ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO GO BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT. I THINK WE WOULD COUNT IT A SUCCESS IF WE COULD JUST EXPLORE PRESENT THINKING, AND GET THE TWO SIDES TO UNDERSTAND FULLY EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS THAT HAVE LED THEM TO THE PRESENT POINT. I DON'T THINK THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO GO VERY FAR BEYOND THE PRESENT POSITIONS, AND THAT WILL NOT BOTHER US.

Q. WILL YOU LEAN HEAVILY ON THE PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES, BECAUSE IN TWO DAYS YOU DON'T DISCUSS THIS KIND OF SUBSTANTIAL MATTER?

A. LET ME COME BACK TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE AGENDA IN THAT RESPECT, BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT--I DON'T WANT TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DOWNGRADE THE SUBSTANTIVE PART OF THIS DISCUSSION--MAYBE WHAT WE'D GET OUT OF THE LONDON TALKS IS THE AGENDA FOR THE ON-GOING TALKS. NOT AN AGENDA IN ANY PRECISE SPELLED-OUT WAY, BUT THE AGENDA OF ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE FURTHER NEGOTIATED. IF YOU COULD DO AS I'VE SUGGESTED AND IDENTIFY CERTAIN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A COMMON APPROACH, THEN IF YOU COULD IDENTIFY CERTAIN AREAS WHERE FULLER ELABORATION AND DISCUSSION ARE NEEDED, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE DEVELOPED AN AGENDA FOR THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS. AS FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED, THE SUBSTANCE IS THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE MEETINGS, THE PROCEDURAL PART ABOUT IT CAN PROBABLY BE AGREED IN A VERY SHORT DISCUSSION AT THE END OF THE PROCESS WHEN WE SEE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. IT MAY BE WHEN YOU'VE REACHED A CERTAIN POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS, AND YOU SEE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED NEXT, THAT CERTAIN KINDS OF MEETINGS WILL COMMEND THEMSELVES. FOR INSTANCE, IF YOU GET TO A DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY MATTERS, THAT'S SOMETHING THAT MIGHT BEST BE REFERRED TO THE WEIZMAN-GAMASY CHANNEL, EVEN THOUGH YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT WEST BANK. TWO MILITARY MEN COULD TALK VERY SENSIBLY ABOUT HOW WOULD YOU HANDLE SECURITY PROBLEMS IN AN AREA LIKE

THAT.

Q. HAVE WEIZMAN AND GAMASY DISCUSSED WEST BANK SECURITY AS FAR AS YOU KNOW?

A. NOT IN DETAIL. MY UNDERSTANDING IS--OF COURSE WE'RE NOT PRIVY TO THOSE MEETINGS--THAT THE BULK OF THOSE MEETINGS, HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE SINAI, BUT AT ONE POINT, THEY DID HAVE SOME DISCUSSIONS OF THE WEST BANK /GAZA, BUT I DON'T THINK IN THE DETAIL THAT YOUR QUESTION IMPLIES.

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Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF SADAT AND BEGIN TO TALK WITH EACH OTHER? DO YOU THINK THAT AFTER ALL THEY HAVE GONE THROUGH THEY STILL COMMUNICATE?

A. I FEEL THAT WHEN YOU GET DOWN TO THE EXTREMELY BASIC ISSUE THAT IS AT STAKE HERE, NAMELY PEACE, THAT IF THE DISCUSSION REACHED THE POINT WHERE BOTH MEN COULD BE TALKING ABOUT THAT SUBJECT IN A WAY THAT BENEFITS BOTH OF THEIR COUNTRIES, THEY COULD HAVE A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. I THINK THAT BOTH MEN ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE. YOUR PRIME MINISTER HAS AN UNUSUAL SENSE OF THE HISTORIC CHALLENGE THAT HE NEEDS TO RESPOND TO. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS THAT WE HAVEN'T HAD PRECISE THINGS TO TALK ABOUT. THE CONVERSATION HASN'T CRYSTALLIZED TO A POINT WHERE THEY COULD GET TOGETHER AGAIN AND TALK ABOUT HOW TO RESOLVE, HOW TO BREAK IMPASSES AND SO ON. I THINK IF WE COULD GET TO THAT POINT THEN I'M SURE THAT THEY COULD (COMMUNICATE.)

Q. I ASKED THE QUESTION BECAUSE SADAT HIMSELF DOUBTED THE POSSIBILITY OF . . .

A. THESE MEN ARE REALLY COMMITTED TO WHAT THEY'VE EMBARKED ON. I THINK THAT SADAT DOESN'T WANT THIS INITIATIVE TO FAIL AND HE'LL DO WHATEVER IS REQUIRED.

Q. DO YOU HAVE SOME COORDINATION WITH THE ISRAELIS? DO YOU HAVE SOME COORDINATING TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT WHAT IS GOING TO BE, NOT WHO IS GOING TO MEET WHOM, NOT THE PROCEDURAL TALKS ABOUT LONDON, BUT POLITICAL COORDINATING TALKS?

A. SAM LEWIS HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO TALK WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ABOUT NOT THE MECHANICS OF HOW TO PROCEED IN THE -LONDON TALKS, BUT WHAT SUBSTANTIALLY WE WOULD HOPE TO GET OUT OF THE LONDON TALKS. THE ANSWER TO YOUR
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QUESTION IS YES, WE FULLY EXPECT TO COORDINATE VIEWS, AND OF COURSE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS IN JERUSALEM WERE PART OF THE ON-GOING PROCESS. I SAY THAT SAM HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO DO THIS. THIS IS SIMPLY THE

LATEST IN A SERIES. IT'S SORT OF THE PRE-GAME WARM-UP FOR THE LONDON TALKS BUT YOU COULD GO BACK TO THE TWO-DAY DAYAN VISIT HERE AT THE END OF APRIL, IN TERMS OF THE...

Q. NO, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS. I'M TALKING ABOUT LONDON.

A. WE'VE BEEN TALKING FOR SEVERAL WEEKS ABOUT GOING TO LONDON, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THERE. THE FIRST QUESTION YOUR GOVERNMENT ASKED WAS, IF WE GO TO LONDON WHAT CAN WE GET OUT OF IT? IS IT A USEFUL THING TO DO? AND WE TALKED ABOUT HOW THIS WOULD FIT INTO AN OVERALL STRATEGY OF RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT ASKED US TO HELP ACHIEVE AND SO ON. WHEN I SAY SAM NOW HAS INSTRUCTIONS; IT'S NOT A LAST MINUTE THOUGHT. IT'S JUST THE LATEST AS I SAY IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIVE...

Q. I'LL MAKE MY QUESTION MORE SPECIFIC. THERE USED TO BE, A YEAR AGO, COORDINATION WHICH WAS ALSO PLACED IN DOCUMENTS AFTER THE SINAI AGREEMENT. IT STATED COORDINATION, POLITICAL COORDINATION, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. IS THERE SUCH COORDINATION TODAY?

A. YES.

Q. AS IT WAS?

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A. YES.

Q. AND WITH EGYPT?

A. YES, WE'VE TALKED TO THEM TOO.

Q. YOU DIDN'T ANSWER MY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WILL LEAD TO ATHERTON GOING TO THE AREA, WHAT WILL LEAD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE GOING TO THE AREA, AND WHAT WILL LEAD TO THE BEERSHEVA-EL ARISH MEETINGS? SUB-QUESTION IS,

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THESE ARE PROPER PLACES, AS BOTH OF THEM ARE ON ISRAELI TERRITORY, OR AT ISRAELI-HELD

TERRITORY?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ABOUT WHETHER THEY'RE PROPER PLACES OR NOT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL MAKE THAT JUDGMENT, ANYWHERE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CHOOSE TO MEET OBVIOUSLY IS FINE WITH US.

Q. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETING IN EL ARISH AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN BEERSHEVA?

A. YOU'RE GETTING TOO SPECIFIC NOW.

A. THAT'S NOT THE IDEA. THE IDEA IS THAT IF THERE WERE MEETINGS, AND IF THEY HAD TO ALTERNATE BETWEEN AN ARAB CITY AND AN ISRAELI CITY, OCCUPIED TERRITORY OR NOT, (THIS IS THEIR VIEW, I'M NOT ADVANCING AN AMERICAN VIEW NOW) THAT WOULD BE ONE WAY TO DO IT. THERE'RE OTHER PLACES THAT MEETINGS COULD TAKE PLACE. THE PLACE OF THE MEETING REALLY ISN'T THE...

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Q. NO, IT'S IMPORTANT. SADAT SUGGESTED IT AND HE HAD SOMETHING IN MIND AND WE HAVE TO EXPLORE WHAT IT IS HE HAS IN MIND TO EXPRESS THAT EL ARISH IS IN EGYPTIAN SOIL, AND BEERSHEVA IS IN ISRAELI SOIL, AND WE GO ONCE TO EGYPTIAN SOIL AND ONCE TO ISRAELI SOIL. THAT'S THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE WHOLE THING.

A. THAT'S A JUDGMENT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE. WE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN LONDON AND THEN THEY WILL MAKE DECISIONS AS TO WHERE THEY MEET NEXT.

Q. AND WHAT ABOUT WHAT WILL LEAD TO...?

A. WHAT WILL LEAD TO THESE ONGOING THINGS IS GETTING ENOUGH OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS SO THAT THERE ARE ISSUES TO BE DEVELOPED, SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION, AND SO ON. I BELIEVE THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED. IT'S A MODEST GOAL, BUT NEVERTHELESS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE, IF YOU COULD SAY THAT WE NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING THINGS WE NEED TO DISCUSS -- ON SECURITY -- IF WE COULD GET THIS GROUP DOING THAT DISCUSSION, AND ON THESE OTHER SUBJECTS LET'S DO THAT IN THE OTHER GROUP AND SO ON.

FOR AN ATHERTON VISIT, WHAT'S SIMPLY NEEDED IS A SENSE THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE AN ONGOING DISCUSSION AND THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIVE AMERICAN

PRESENCE JUST TO KEEP OUR HAND IN. THAT'S A FAIRLY SIMPLE PROPOSITION. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO GO, I CAN'T TELL YOU RIGHT NOW PRECISELY WHAT IT WOULD TAKE, BUT A SENSE THAT ENOUGH PREPARATORY WORK HAS TAKEN PLACE, SO THAT DISCUSSIONS AT THAT LEVEL (THEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER-PRESIDENT, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERI-
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CAN PRESIDENT LEVEL) THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE SOMETHING THAT ROY CAN'T CONTRIBUTE.

Q. WOULD THE SECRETARY GO TO PUT HIS SIGNATURE ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES?

A. NOT NECESSARILY THAT. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD GO TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER AGREEMENT. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT HE WOULD JUST BE GOING TO BE SIGNING SOMETHING ANYWAY, WE DON'T HAVE TO BE PRESENT WHEN THE OTHER TWO SIDES AGREE. WHEN THEY'RE READY TO AGREE, WE'LL BE HAPPY TO WITHDRAW.

Q. SINCE IT HAS BEEN ON THE RECORD THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT COME UP WITH ITS OWN PROPOSALS, COULD YOU GIVE US ANY KIND OF IDEA, IN WHICH KIND OF SITUATION POINT THIS WOULD BE...

A. LET'S EXPLORE THIS, BECAUSE THERE'S A GREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND ALSO A LOT OF, PERHAPS, UNFORTUNATE APPREHENSION ABOUT THIS. AS YOU KNOW I'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, AND I HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVANCED AMERICAN IDEAS. AS YOU WELL REMEMBER IN THE SINAI II AGREEMENT, THERE'S A DOCUMENT WHICH SAYS "U.S. PROPOSAL" AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE, AND THEN IT SPELLS OUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SINAI MISSION AND THE FORCE LIMITATIONS AND SO ON. THAT WAS ADVANCED BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE WANTED TO PUT FORWARD THOSE IDEAS, BUT THEY SAID THAT HAVING DISCUSSED THEM THEY WOULD ACCEPT THEM IF WE PROPOSED THEM. SO, AT THE REQUEST OF BOTH SIDES, WE PUT FORWARD THESE IDEAS. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, IN THE LONG SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, THERE CAME A TIME WHEN THE TWO SIDES HAD TALKED AND WE SIMPLY DEFINED WHAT WE HEARD FROM BOTH
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SIDES AS A MIDDLE GROUND AND AS A WORKING DOCUMENT THAT THEY DISCUSSED FURTHER AND BECAME THE BASIS OF

AGREEMENT. IN JANUARY IT WAS OUR IDEA FOR THE AGENDA FOR THE JERUSALEM MEETINGS THAT BROKE THE DEADLOCK THERE. AND THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THAT ROY'S BEEN WORKING ON WAS WRITTEN WHEN, AT JERUSALEM THE EGYPTIANS HAD PUT A PAPER ON THE TABLE AND THE ISRAELIS ALSO HAD. I THINK THAT YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER SAID, "GO DOWN TO YOUR HOTEL ROOM AND SEE IF YOU CAN PUT DOWN WHAT'S COMMON IN THESE TWO PAPERS. WHERE THERE'S DIVERGENCE, JUST MAKE TWO COLUMNS. GIVE US A WORKING DOCUMENT TO TALK FROM. THAT'S WHAT WE DID. THIS IS WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT NOW WHEN WE TALK ABOUT ADVANCING AMERICAN PLANS. I'M NOT QUITE SURE IN WHAT WAY WE MIGHT DO THAT, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT AT SOME POINT IT MAY WELL BE AND IT WOULD GROW OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REASON I GO THROUGH THIS LONG HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION IS THAT THERE WERE A COUPLE OF OTHER AMERICAN PLANS THAT WEREN'T LIKE THIS. THERE WAS A ROGERS PLAN ONCE, AND THERE WAS A BROOKINGS REPORT, AND THERE'VE BEEN A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS LIKE THAT. THEY WERE AMERICAN PAPERS DEVELOPED EITHER BY THE GOVERNMENT OR BY PRIVATE AMERICANS WITH

AMERICANS TALKING TO EACH OTHER. THEY WERE MADE IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY WERE NOT DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES. THAT IS A DIFFERENT KIND OF THING. THE BROOKINGS REPORT IS A PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE THING FOR A GROUP OF AMERICANS TO SIT DOWN AND WRITE. IT'S NOT A NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT AND IT'S NOT AN AMERICAN PLAN IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE ON THE PARTIES. WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT A ROGERS PLAN, OR A BROOKINGS REPORT, OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT AN AMERICAN ROLE IN THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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MIDST OF VERY ELABORATE NEGOTIATIONS, IDEAS ADVANCED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRYSTALLIZING THE NEGOTIATIONS, HELPING THE PARTIES FIND MIDDLE GROUND AND MOVING ON FROM THERE.

Q. AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO THIS ONLY WHEN BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PROPER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF PROPOSAL?

A. SOMETIMES WE VOLUNTEER THINGS WITHOUT ASKING PERMISSION OF THE TWO SIDES. I CAN'T REALLY SAY UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD BE PUT FORWARD, BUT IN A CONVERSATION YOU THROW OUT AN IDEA VERBALLY AND THEN MAYBE LATER REDUCE IT TO WRITING. THERE'S A HOLE COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITIES HERE, BUT ESSENTIALLY YOU START WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT WE ARE THERE AT THE REQUEST OF BOTH SIDES TO HELP THEM FIND A MIDDLE GROUND. SO OUR MERE ROLE AND PRESENCE REFLECT THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE TWO SIDES THAT WE PLAY THIS ROLE, AND THE ROLE IS GOING TO INCLUDE IN THE

FUTURE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, HELPING THEM FIND MIDDLE GROUND, BREAKING IMPASSES, PRODUCING USEFUL WORKING DRAFTS OR WHATEVER THE SITUATION DEMANDS. THAT SEEMS TO ME IN THE SPIRIT OF WHAT WE'VE BEEN ASKED TO DO.

Q. (UNCLEAR, BUT RELATES TO THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK).

A. MY VIEW OF THIS IS THAT WE'VE LOOKED AT THE WEST BANK PROBLEM AND REALIZED THE COMPLICATED ISSUES THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED THERE. FIRST OF ALL, THERE'S THE SECURITY ISSUE FOR ISRAEL. THAT HAS TWO PARTS, PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION, AND PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM. THEY'RE TWO DIFFERENT PROBLEMS BUT THEY BOTH COME UNDER THE HEADING OF SECURITY. THERE IS A QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY WILL EXIST IF ISRAEL RELINQUISHES OR RELEASES, OR RELAXES ITS CONTROL ON THAT TERRITORY. THERE IS THE QUESTION OF BEYOND THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITY, OF WHAT KIND OF LONG-TERM POLITICAL BODY WILL EXIST THERE AND HOW IT WILL

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RELATE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. THAT'S A QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP IT WILL HAVE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, WHAT THE LINES BETWEEN THEM ULTIMATELY WILL BE AND WHAT THE RE-

LATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PEOPLE IN THOSE TERRITORIES MIGHT BE. THESE THINGS ARE TOO COMPLICATED TO RESOLVE ALL IN ONE BASKET SO, WE CAME A YEAR AND A QUARTER AGO TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF TRANSITIONAL REGIME. EVERYBODY PRETTY MUCH AGREES WITH THAT. NOW YOUR GOVERNMENT PICKED IT UP IN THE SELF-RULE PLAN. SADAT HAS ADOPTED IT. I THINK THE JORDANIANS AND THE SAUDIS ALSO AGREE. THE PROBLEM WE HAVE TO RESOLVE HERE, IS TWO-FOLD: ONE IS HOW CAN YOU ASSURE THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS ARE MET IN THAT PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU'RE GOING TO GET WILLING ARAB PARTICIPANTS IN THAT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, THEY HAVE TO HAVE A SENSE THAT SOME OF THEIR OBJECTIVES WILL BE MET AT THE END OF THE PROCESS. IT DOESN'T SURPRISE ME THAT AT THIS STAGE IN THIS TRANSITIONAL PROCESS AND THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT COMMITTING ITSELF TO THE OUTCOME OF THAT PROCESS. I'M NOT SO SURE THAT AS ISRAEL BECOMES MORE ASSURED IT'S SECURITY NEEDS CAN BE MET, THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION MIGHT NOT EVOLVE ON THIS QUESTION WHICH IS OF CONCERN TO THE ARABS. THE QUESTION IS, WHAT'S THE DESTINATION OF THIS TRANSITIONAL PROCESS. I DON'T, IN ANY WAY, WANT TO INTERPRET THE DEBATE IN ISRAEL OVER THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT WE'VE POSED, BUT IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS ENTERING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN A SPIRIT THAT EVERY REASONABLE PROPOSAL IS NEGOTIABLE AND THAT IF NEW IDEAS ARE PUT ON THE TABLE THEY CAN BE DIS-

CUSSED. ISRAEL HAS NOT TIED ITS HANDS FROM PERMITTING
ITS OWN POSITION TO EVOLVE. BUT WE HAVE THIS BASIC
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PROBLEM TO RESOLVE, ISRAELI SECURITY ON THE ONE HAND AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST BANK, AND THE QUESTION OF
WHO CONTROLS THE TERRITORY ULTIMATELY. THOSE THINGS
WILL HAVE TO GO AHEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SIDE-BY-SIDE.
IF YOU HAVE TO RULE OUT ALL PROGRESS ON EITHER OF THOSE
ISSUES, THEN YOU COULDNT HAVE A NEGOTIATION. I DON'T
THINK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS DONE THAT. THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT ALL PROPOSITIONS ARE NEGOTIABLE,
BUT IT DOES NOT FIND THE EGYPTIAN PLAN AT THIS STAGE
ACCEPTABLE, WHILE THE EGYPTIANS HAVE SAID IT DOESN'T FIND
THE SELF-RULE PLAN AT THIS STAGE ACCEPTABLE. THAT'S
WHAT HAPPENS AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEGOTIATION. AT THE
SAME TIME, THE CABINET SPOKESMAN SAID THAT WHAT THAT MEANS
IS THAT WE'RE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING. SO,
NEGOTIATIONS CAN MOVE AHEAD.

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FOR ICA/NEA INFO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (SAUNDERS, HAROLD)

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS BACKGROUND BRIEFING
TO ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS
BEGIN TEXT:

1. FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SAUNDERS GAVE TO ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON
JULY 13. ATTRIBUTION IS "TO U.S. OFFICIALS."

LET ME SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT LONDON. WE'RE GLAD THAT CONTACTS IN THIS FORM ARE RECONVENING. WE WELCOME CONTACTS IN ANY FORM. WE'RE PARTICULARLY HAPPY WHEN EGYPTIAN AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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ISRAELI OFFICIALS GET TOGETHER ON THEIR OWN, BUT THERE SEEMS TO BE VALUE IN RECONVENING THEM IN THIS PARTICULAR FORUM. WE HOPE TO HAVE GOOD, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT EACH SIDE TO PROBE THE THINKING BEHIND EACH OTHER'S APPROACHES TO THE WEST BANK/GAZA PROBLEMS. SECOND, WE HOPE THAT OUT OF THIS WOULD COME SOME UNDERSTANDING ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATIONS. SO IN LONDON THERE ARE TWO SETS OF CONCERNS. ONE, THERE'S THE SUBSTANTIVE CONCERN IN ADVANCING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECOND IS THE PROCEDURAL CONCERN OF ESTABLISHING THE WAY TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. WE DON'T EXPECT A NEW AGREEMENT OR A NEW PAPER TO COME OUT OF LONDON. IT'S NOT A MEETING FROM

WHICH ONE EXPECTS SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS IN A SENSE OF THERE BEING A NEW AGREEMENT. WHAT WE DO EXPECT IS THAT BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND PROCEDURALLY LONDON CAN PROVIDE A STARTING POINT FOR ANOTHER SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Q. SPECIFICALLY HOW DOES THE MEETING BETWEEN WEIZMAN, SADAT AND GAMASY FIT INTO THE PICTURE?

A. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THIS TRACK, AS YOU WELL KNOW, STARTING WITH THE MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COMMITTEE AND THE SEVERAL MEETINGS THE DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE HAD. THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, SINCE JANUARY, DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO SET UP THOSE MEETINGS SO THIS MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED ON THAT OTHER TRACK AND THEREFORE TECHNICALLY IS APART FROM THE TRACK THAT WE'RE REVIVING IN LONDON. ANY NEGOTIATION ON ANY TRACK IS PART OF THE WHOLE PICTURE AND I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WEIZMAN AND GAMASY OR WEIZMAN AND SADAT WILL BE TALKING ABOUT THERE. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT ANY CONVERSATIONS AT
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THAT LEVEL ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND HAVE TO MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO ADVANCING THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WHAT WE'RE DOING IN LONDON I THINK IS A RATHER SPECIAL JOB. AS YOU RECALL WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGAN IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN JANUARY WHERE WE'VE MOVE THROUGH DISCUSSIONS OF A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WE HAVE GOTTEN DOWN TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BECAUSE WE'VE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO GO INTO SOME DEPTH ON ESE SUBJECTS AS YOUR PRIME MINISTER RIGHTLY SAID, IF YOU ARE GOING TO AGREE ON A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, YOU HAVE TO KNOW WHAT FOLLOWS FROM IT. AND THEREFORE WE ALWAYS KNEW THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR THIS AND YOUR PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED IT WHEN THEY ADVANCED THE SELF RULE PLAN. SO THE LONDON TALKS WILL FOCUS LARGEY ON THAT COLLECTION OF PROBLEMS. THERE IS OF COURSE THE OTHER TRACK OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS GOING ON ENTIRELY APART FROM THE TRAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO LONDON, BUT OF COURSE THEY ARE ALL PART OF THE WHOLE PICTURE.

Q. DID THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH GETTING THIS MEETING TODAY ARRANGED?

A. NO, WE DID NOT.

Q. DID YOU KNOW ABOUT IT?

A. WE WERE INFORMED WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS THAT IT WAS GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND WE WERE LITERALLY INFORMED.

Q. WERE YOU SURPRISED?

A. I'M CERTAINLY SURPRISED, YES. I THINK THAT'S PROBABLY THE WAY TO PUT IT. WE ARE DELIGHTED WHEN THESE THINGS
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HAPPEN. WE, OF COURSE, HAD TALKED WITH BOTH SIDES DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO ISRAEL ABOUT OUR HOPES THAT ANOTHER WEIZMAN-GAMASY MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND AS YOU WILL RECALL THERE WERE EXCHANGES GOING ON BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY AT THAT TIME. WE'VE NOT INTERFERED IN THAT LINE OF COMMUNICATION AT ALL. SO, IT DOESN'T SURPRISE US OR BOTHER US THAT THIS MEETING WAS ARRANGED AND THAT WE WERE INFORMED ABOUT IT WHEN IT WAS ARRANGED. THAT'S FINE - THAT'S DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT THEIR BEST AND WE APPLAUD THAT.

Q. WHAT POSSIBLY COULD FOLLOW THE LONDON MEETING?

A. WELL, I THINK THE COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITIES THAT I CAN LAY OUT WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

FURTHER DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, EITHER IN THE DAYAN-KAMEL OR IN THE WEIZMAN-GAMASY CHANNEL. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT MEETINGS BE ARRANGED ALTERNATELY IN BEER SHEVA AND EL ARISH. SO THAT'S ONE POSSIBILITY.

Q. WHO SUGGESTED BEERSHEVA AND EL ARISH?

A. SADAT HAS HAD THE IDEA OF AN EL ARISH MEETING AND AN ALTERNATE IN BEERSHEVA. THAT'S A POSSIBILITY. THE SECOND ELEMENT THAT'S POSSIBLE -- NONE OF THESE EXCLUDE ANY OF THE OTHERS--IS THAT ROY ATHERTON COULD GO BACK TO THE AREA TO CONTINUE THE SUBSTANTIVE WORK THAT COMES OUT OF THE LONDON MEETING AND KEEP THAT ALIVE. THIRD, THERE'S A POSSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TAKING A TRIP TO THE AREA SOMEWHAT LATER TO BUILD ON WHATZVZR IS ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS OTHER COMBINATION OF EFFORTS. HOW ALL THATS PUT TOGETHER WE REALLY CAN'T PRECISELY FORESEE, BUT WE DO ENVISION A PROCESS WHICH INVOLVES MOST OF THOSE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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(ELEMENTS).

Q. CBS REPORTED A LIKELY EL ARISH MEETING. IS VANCE GOING TO THAT?

A. I REALLY DON'T KNOW. I AM NOT BEING EVASIVE AT ALL AT THIS POINT, BUT WHAT WE CAN'T TELL IS WHAT KIND OF MEETING THAT WOULD BE, WHEN IT WOULD TAKE PLACE, WHETHER IT WOULD BE PRELIMINARY, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING SPECIFIC.

Q. AT THIS POINT THERE'S NO AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO REMOVE THE TALKS TO BEERSHEVA?

A. NO, IT'S JUST AN IDEA THAT I THINK PEOPLE ARE GENERALLY RECEPTIVE TO THAT ARE WAITING FOR LONDON TO CRYSTALLIZE A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WOULD MAKE SENSE. UNTIL WE'VE BEEN TO LONDON WE REALLY WON'T UNDERSTAND QUITE HOW ALL THESE PIECES CAN FIT TOGETHER IN THE MOST USEFUL WAY. IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE SECRETARY, I THINK THE SECRETARY WOULD DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE TALKS, AS LONG AS IT WOULD SEEM TO BE OF A REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT IT WOULD HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

Q. NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE HAS REALLY CHANGED SINCE YOU MADE THE PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS AND A FEW DAYS LATER

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON MADE A SPEECH TO CONGRESS. WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO BRING REAL PROGRESS IN THE PEACE EFFORT? ARE THE REACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THEY ARE IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITIONS?

A. ONE THING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THOSE TWO SPEECHES IS THE VERY THOUGHTFUL SPEECH THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT GAVE IN THE KNESSET BUILDING DURING HIS VISIT THERE AND
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HE ADDRESSED THE SAME SUBJECT THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE. THE OTHER THING THAT'S HAPPENED SINCE THAT STATEMENT WAS MADE TO THE HAMILTON SUB-COMMITTEE OF COURSE IS THAT WE NOW HAVE THE EGYPTIAN PAPER ON THE TABLE. THAT STATEMENT TO THE HAMILTON SUB-COMMITTEE WAS MY EFFORT TO SAY SOME THINGS ABOUT AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST THAT HAVE A LASTING QUALITY -- THAT ARE NOT GEARED TO THE PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION. WHAT YOU SAW THERE WAS A STATEMENT OF A FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN VIEW, NOT A VIEW GEARED TO ANY TACTICAL SITUATION. I THOUGHT THAT AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND PARTICULARLY IN THE WAKE OF THE VERY HEATED DEBATE OVER THE AIRCRAFT SALES THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SOMEBODY TO STEP BACK FROM THE DAY-TO-DAY SITUATION AND TRY TO PROVIDE AMERICANS WITH A WAY OF LOOKING AT THE MIDDLE EAST THAT ENCOMPASSED ALL OF OUR INTERESTS THERE. THAT WAS REALLY THE PURPOSE OF THAT STATEMENT. THERE WERE SOME DEEP CONCERNS, AND THERE WERE SOME RATHER NASTY ARGUMENTS DURING THE DEBATE OVER THE AIRCRAFT SALE. I FELT THAT IF WE COULD ALL STEP BACK HERE AND GET THE MIDDLE EAST IN ITS BROADEST POSSIBLE

PERSPECTIVE THAT WE COULD SEE THAT WE COULD PURSUE EACH OF OUR INTERESTS AND OUR COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL AS WELL AS OUR INTERESTS ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITHOUT ANY SACRIFICE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. I WANTED TO GIVE PEOPLE A WAY OF THINKING THAT WOULD LEAVE THEM COMFORTABLE ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING AND ALSO TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE INTEREST OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO MOVE TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN A MEASURED WAY. IT COMES DOWN TO SOME VERY BASIC ISSUES. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE FOR ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM STRENGTH IS THE
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QUESTION OF SECURITY. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE OTHER HISTORICAL, EMOTIONAL CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES THAT COME INTO PLAY WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THE WEST BANK BUT

TO BEGIN WITH THE FIRST PRIORITY OF COURSE IS THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL BE SECURE. OUR QUESTION IS THE QUESTION WE HAVE EXPLORED WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR A LONG TIME -- WHETHER THAT SECURITY CAN BE PROVIDED, APART FROM WHERE YOU DRAW THE LINE.

Q. YOU OUTLINED THREE POSSIBILITIES OF OUTCOMES FROM LONDON. THESE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN SCENARIOS. WHAT WILL LEAD TO THESE SCENARIOS?

A. THOSE THREE DEVELOPMENTS ARE AS I SAID NOT EXCLUSIVE AND PROBABLY WHAT WILL HAPPEN WILL BE SOME COMBINATION OF THEM. WHAT IS REALLY IMPORTANT OUT OF LONDON IS TO JOIN DISCUSSION ON THE TWO PROPOSALS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I DON'T MEAN THAT TECHNICALLY IN THE SENSE OF THE TWO PAPERS ALONE, BUT WHAT I AM TALKING ABOUT IS THE TWO APPROACHES TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA PROBLEM. AS YOU LOOK AT THOSE PAPERS IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACHES. CERTAINLY THERE'S AN AGREEMENT THAT LIES BEHIND THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES, BOTH OF THEM, BUT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE ARE PEACE TREATIES, FINAL PEACE, FULL AND NORMAL RELATIONS. THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT DID NOT HAPPEN TO SPELL THAT OUT, BUT THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT -- LIKE THE PRIME MINISTER'S SELF-RULE PLAN WHICH DIDN'T MENTION THESE ISSUES EITHER -- ASSUMES THAT THEY ARE IN THE OTHER DOCUMENT, IN THE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES, AND THAT'S THE BACKDROP FOR THESE PARTICULAR DOCUMENTS. ANYWAY, THAT ON THE TABLE. I THINK THAT ALSO THERE'S BEEN COMMENT ABOUT THE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF TRANSITIONAL REGIME.

IN OTHER WORDS IF WE CAN GET FROM LONDON A DEFINITION OF COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACHES, THEN WE CAN GO ON TO A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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SECOND CATEGORY OF ISSUES WHICH ARE DISCUSSED IN BOTH PLANS BUT NOT IN DETAIL AND REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION, PARTICULARLY ON THE SECURITY POINT. THE ISRAELI PLAN ADDRESSES THE SECURITY POINT IN CERTAIN WAYS. THE EGYPTIAN PLAN, IN A LESS ELABORATE WAY, SAYS THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BOTH DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. I THINK THERE OBVIOUSLY COULD BE A VERY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION IN THAT AREA.

Q. WHAT IS GOING TO BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA?

A. WE DO NOT HAVE AN AGENDA, IN THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD. WE ARE TRYING NOT TO MAKE THIS A CONFERENCE. WE WANT IT TO BE A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS -- BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, IN AN INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE. WE DON'T WANT ANY OF THE TRAPPINGS OF THE FORMAL CONFERENCE BECAUSE WE FEEL

THAT GETS IN THE WAY OF THE KIND OF DIRECT AND EASY EX-
CHANGE THAT IS IMPORTANT. WE WANT TO DO EVERYTHING WE
CAN TO FACILITATE A GENUINE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN
THE TWO SIDES, WITH US PRESENT OR WITH US NOT PRESENT AS
IT SEEMS CONVENIENT TO THE TWO SIDES. I THINK WHAT WE
WILL SUGGEST DOING IS STARTING WITH THE TWO PAPERS THAT
ARE ON THE TABLE NOW AND AFFORDING EACH SIDE AN OPPOR-
TUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND ITS APPROACH AND
TO ASK THE OTHER SIDE QUESTIONS THAT NEED CLARIFYING AND
SO ON, OUT OF THIS EXCHANGE, PERHAPS, TO DEVELOP A FULLER
PICTURE OF WHERE THE REAL POINTS OF DIFFICULTY ARE, AND
WHERE REAL POINTS OF AGREEMENT MIGHT BE DEVELOPED.

Q. DO YOU FEEL THAT KAMEL HAS THE CLOUT TO BE ABLE TO
MOVE BEYOND THE WELL-KNOWN EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, IN CASE
THERE'S OPPORTUNITY? BECAUSE I KNOW THAT BACK IN JANUARY
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HE'D BEEN FRESH ON THE JOB AND THERE WAS SOME CONCERN
WHETHER HE WAS A GOOD OPPOSITE NUMBER FOR DAYAN.

A. WE HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION WITH HIM IN NEW YORK
WHEN THE SECRETARY HAD LUNCH WITH HIM DURING THE SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT AND OBVIOUSLY AT THAT TIME WE
WEREN'T TALKING IN DETAIL ABOUT THIS EGYPTIAN PLAN, BUT
TALKING ABOUT

THE PROBLEM. WE FOUND KAMEL QUITE IN COMMAND OF THE
ISSUES THAT WERE BEING DISCUSSED AND READY TO DISCUSS THEM
IN A QUITE FREE AND OPEN WAY, SO I THINK THAT WE CAN HAVE
A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. OBVIOUSLY, BOTH SIDES ARE GOING
TO BE OPERATING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF INSTRUCTIONS IMPOSED
BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND WE WON'T FAULT EITHER SIDE IF
THEY CAN ONLY GO UP TO A CERTAIN POINT. AFTER ALL,
WE'RE GOING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS IN A TWO DAY PERIOD THAT,
BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF TIME, ARE NOT GOING TO BE
ABLE TO GO BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT. I THINK WE WOULD COUNT
IT A SUCCESS IF WE COULD JUST EXPLORE PRESENT THINKING,
AND GET THE TWO SIDES TO UNDERSTAND FULLY EACH OTHER'S
POSITIONS THAT HAVE LED THEM TO THE PRESENT POINT.
I DON'T THINK THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO GO VERY FAR
BEYOND THE PRESENT POSITIONS, AND THAT WILL NOT BOTHER
US.

Q. WILL YOU LEAN HEAVILY ON THE PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES,
BECAUSE IN TWO DAYS YOU DON'T DISCUSS THIS KIND OF SUB-
STANTIAL MATTER?

A. LET ME COME BACK TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE AGENDA IN
THAT RESPECT, BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT--I DON'T WANT TO
DOWNGRADE THE SUBSTANTIVE PART OF THIS DISCUSSION--MAYBE

WHAT WE'D GET OUT OF THE LONDON TALKS IS THE AGENDA FOR
THE ON-GOING TALKS. NOT AN AGENDA IN ANY PRECISE SPELLED-
OUT WAY, BUT THE AGENDA OF ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE FURTHER
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NEGOTIATED. IF YOU COULD DO AS I'VE SUGGESTED AND
IDENTIFY CERTAIN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A COMMON APPROACH,
THEN IF YOU COULD IDENTIFY CERTAIN AREAS WHERE FULLER
ELABORATION AND DISCUSSION ARE NEEDED, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE
DEVELOPED AN AGENDA FOR THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS. AS
FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED, THE SUBSTANCE IS THE MAIN FOCUS
OF THE MEETINGS, THE PROCEDURAL PART ABOUT IT CAN PROBABLY
BE AGREED IN A VERY SHORT DISCUSSION AT THE END OF THE
PROCESS WHEN WE SEE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. IT MAY BE
WHEN YOU'VE REACHED A CERTAIN POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS,
AND YOU SEE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED NEXT, THAT CERTAIN
KINDS OF MEETINGS WILL COMMEND THEMSELVES. FOR INSTANCE,
IF YOU GET TO A DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY MATTERS, THAT'S
SOMETHING THAT MIGHT BEST BE REFERRED TO THE WEIZMAN-
GAMASY CHANNEL, EVEN THOUGH YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT WEST
BANK. TWO MILITARY MEN COULD TALK VERY SENSIBLY ABOUT
HOW WOULD YOU HANDLE SECURITY PROBLEMS IN AN AREA LIKE
THAT.

Q. HAVE WEIZMAN AND GAMASY DISCUSSED WEST BANK SECURITY
AS FAR AS YOU KNOW?

A. NOT IN DETAIL. MY UNDERSTANDING IS--OF COURSE WE'RE
NOT PRIVY TO THOSE MEETINGS--THAT THE BULK OF THOSE MEET-
INGS, HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE SINAI, BUT AT
ONE POINT, THEY DID HAVE SOME DISCUSSIONS OF THE WEST BANK
/GAZA, BUT I DONT THINK IN THE DETAIL THAT YOUR QUESTION
IMPLIES.

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF SADAT AND
BEGIN TO TALK WITH EACH OTHER? DO YOU THINK THAT AFTER
ALL THEY HAVE GONE THROUGH THEY STILL COMMUNICATE?

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A. I FEEL THAT WHEN YOU GET DOWN TO THE EXTREMELY BASIC
ISSUE THAT IS AT STAKE HERE, NAMELY PEACE, THAT IF THE
DISCUSSION REACHED THE POINT WHERE BOTH MEN COULD BE
TALKING ABOUT THAT SUBJECT IN A WAY THAT BENEFITS BOTH OF
THEIR COUNTRIES, THEY COULD HAVE A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION.
I THINK THAT BOTH MEN ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE OBJEC-
TIVE OF PEACE. YOUR PRIME MINISTER HAS AN UNUSUAL SENSE
OF THE HISTORIC CHALLENGE THAT HE NEEDS TO RESPOND TO.

THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS THAT WE HAVEN'T HAD PRECISE THINGS TO TALK ABOUT. THE CONVERSATION HASN'T CRYSTALLIZED TO A POINT WHERE THEY COULD GET TOGETHER AGAIN AND TALK ABOUT HOW TO RESOLVE, HOW TO BREAK IMPASSES AND SO ON. I THINK IF WE COULD GET TO THAT POINT THEN I'M SURE THAT THEY COULD (COMMUNICATE.)

Q. I ASKED THE QUESTION BECAUSE SADAT HIMSELF DOUBTED THE POSSIBILITY OF . . .

A. THESE MEN ARE REALLY COMMITTED TO WHAT THEY'VE EMBARKED ON. I THINK THAT SADAT DOESN'T WANT THIS INITIATIVE TO FAIL AND HE'LL DO WHATEVER IS REQUIRED.

Q. DO YOU HAVE SOME COORDINATION WITH THE ISRAELIS? DO YOU HAVE SOME COORDINATING TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT WHAT IS GOING TO BE, NOT WHO IS GOING TO MEET WHOM, NOT THE PROCEDURAL TALKS ABOUT LONDON, BUT POLITICAL COORDINATING TALKS?

A. SAM LEWIS HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO TALK WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ABOUT NOT THE MECHANICS OF HOW TO PROCEED IN THE -LONDON TALKS, BUT WHAT SUBSTANTIALLY WE WOULD HOPE TO GET OUT OF THE LONDON TALKS. THE ANSWER TO YOUR

QUESTION IS YES, WE FULLY EXPECT TO COORDINATE VIEWS, AND OF COURSE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS IN JERUSALEM WERE PART OF THE ON-GOING PROCESS. I SAY THAT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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SAM HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO DO THIS. THIS IS SIMPLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES. IT'S SORT OF THE PRE-GAME WARM-UP FOR THE LONDON TALKS BUT YOU COULD GO BACK TO THE TWO-DAY DAYAN VISIT HERE AT THE END OF APRIL, IN TERMS OF THE...

Q. NO, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS. I'M TALKING ABOUT LONDON.

A. WE'VE BEEN TALKING FOR SEVERAL WEEKS ABOUT GOING TO LONDON, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THERE. THE FIRST QUESTION YOUR GOVERNMENT ASKED WAS, IF WE GO TO LONDON WHAT CAN WE GET OUT OF IT? IS IT A USEFUL THING TO DO? AND WE TALKED ABOUT HOW THIS WOULD FIT INTO AN OVERALL STRATEGY OF RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT ASKED US TO HELP ACHIEVE AND SO ON. WHEN I SAY SAM NOW HAS INSTRUCTIONS; IT'S NOT A LAST MINUTE THOUGHT. IT'S JUST THE LATEST AS I SAY IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIVE...

Q. I'LL MAKE MY QUESTION MORE SPECIFIC. THERE USED TO

BE, A YEAR AGO, COORDINATION WHICH WAS ALSO PLACED IN DOCUMENTS AFTER THE SINAI AGREEMENT. IT STATED COORDINATION, POLITICAL COORDINATION, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. IS THERE SUCH COORDINATION TODAY?

A. YES.

Q. AS IT WAS?

A. YES.

Q. AND WITH EGYPT?

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A. YES, WE'VE TALKED TO THEM TOO.

Q. YOU DIDN'T ANSWER MY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WILL LEAD TO ATHERTON GOING TO THE AREA, WHAT WILL LEAD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE GOING TO THE AREA, AND WHAT WILL LEAD TO THE BEERSHEVA-EL ARISH MEETINGS? SUB-QUESTION IS,

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THESE ARE PROPER PLACES, AS BOTH OF THEM ARE ON ISRAELI TERRITORY, OR AT ISRAELI-HELD TERRITORY?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ABOUT WHETHER THEY'RE PROPER PLACES OR NOT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL MAKE THAT JUDGMENT, ANYWHERE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CHOOSE TO MEET OBVIOUSLY IS FINE WITH US.

Q. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETING IN EL ARISH AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN BEERSHEVA?

A. YOU'RE GETTING TOO SPECIFIC NOW.

A. THAT'S NOT THE IDEA. THE IDEA IS THAT IF THERE WERE MEETINGS, AND IF THEY HAD TO ALTERNATE BETWEEN AN ARAB CITY AND AN ISRAELI CITY, OCCUPIED TERRITORY OR NOT, (THIS IS THEIR VIEW, I'M NOT ADVANCING AN AMERICAN VIEW NOW) THAT WOULD BE ONE WAY TO DO IT. THERE'RE OTHER PLACES THAT MEETINGS COULD TAKE PLACE. THE PLACE OF THE MEETING REALLY ISN'T THE...

Q. NO, IT'S IMPORTANT. SADAT SUGGESTED IT AND HE HAD SOMETHING IN MIND AND WE HAVE TO EXPLORE WHAT IT IS HE HAS IN MIND TO EXPRESS THAT EL ARISH IS IN EGYPTIAN SOIL, AND BEERSHEVA IS IN ISRAELI SOIL, AND WE GO ONCE TO EGY-
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PTIAN SOIL AND ONCE TO ISRAELI SOIL. THAT'S THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE WHOLE THING.

A. THAT'S A JUDGMENT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE. WE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN LONDON AND THEN THEY WILL MAKE DECISIONS AS TO WHERE THEY MEET NEXT.

Q. AND WHAT ABOUT WHAT WILL LEAD TO...?

A. WHAT WILL LEAD TO THESE ONGOING THINGS IS GETTING ENOUGH OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS SO THAT THERE ARE ISSUES TO BE DEVELOPED, SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION, AND SO ON. I BELIEVE THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED. IT'S A MODEST GOAL, BUT NEVERTHELESS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE, IF YOU COULD SAY THAT WE NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING THINGS WE NEED TO DISCUSS -- ON SECURITY -- IF WE COULD GET THIS GROUP DOING THAT DISCUSSION, AND ON THESE OTHER SUBJECTS LET'S DO THAT IN THE OTHER GROUP AND SO ON.

FOR AN ATHERTON VISIT, WHAT'S SIMPLY NEEDED IS A SENSE THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE AN ONGOING DISCUSSION AND THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIVE AMERICAN PRESENCE JUST TO KEEP OUR HAND IN. THAT'S A FAIRLY SIMPLE PROPOSITION. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO GO, I CAN'T TELL YOU RIGHT NOW PRECISELY WHAT IT WOULD TAKE, BUT A SENSE THAT ENOUGH PREPARATORY WORK HAS TAKEN PLACE, SO THAT DISCUSSIONS AT THAT LEVEL (THEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER-PRESIDENT, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT LEVEL) THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE SOMETHING THAT ROY CAN'T CONTRIBUTE.

Q. WOULD THE SECRETARY GO TO PUT HIS SIGNATURE ON A
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DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES?

A. NOT NECESSARILY THAT. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD GO TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER AGREEMENT. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT HE WOULD JUST BE GOING TO BE SIGNING SOMETHING. ANYWAY, WE DON'T HAVE TO BE PRESENT WHEN THE OTHER TWO SIDES AGREE. WHEN THEY'RE READY TO AGREE, WE'LL BE HAPPY TO WITHDRAW.

Q. SINCE IT HAS BEEN ON THE RECORD THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT COME UP WITH ITS OWN PROPOSALS, COULD YOU GIVE US ANY KIND OF IDEA, IN WHICH

KIND OF SITUATION POINT THIS WOULD BE...

A. LET'S EXPLORE THIS, BECAUSE THERE'S A GREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND ALSO A LOT OF, PERHAPS, UNFORTUNATE APPREHENSION ABOUT THIS. AS YOU KNOW I'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, AND I HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVANCED AMERICAN IDEAS. AS YOU WELL REMEMBER IN THE SINAI II AGREEMENT, THERE'S A DOCUMENT WHICH SAYS "U.S. PROPOSAL" AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE, AND THEN IT SPELLS OUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SINAI MISSION AND THE FORCE LIMITATIONS AND SO ON. THAT WAS ADVANCED BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE WANT TO PUT FORWARD THOSE IDEAS, BUT THEY SAID THAT HAVING DISCUSSED THEM THEY WOULD ACCEPT THEM IF WE PROPOSED THEM. SO, AT THE REQUEST OF BOTH SIDES, WE PUT FORWARD THESE IDEAS. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, IN THE LONG SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, THERE CAME A TIME WHEN THE TWO SIDES HAD TALKED AND WE SIMPLY DEFINED WHAT WE HEARD FROM BOTH SIDES AS A MIDDLE GROUND AND AS A WORKING DOCUMENT THAT THEY DISCUSSED FURTHER AND BECAME THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT. IN JANUARY IT WAS OUR IDEA FOR THE AGENDA FOR THE JERUSALEM MEETINGS THAT BROKE THE DEADLOCK

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THERE. AND THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THAT ROY'S BEEN WORKING ON WAS WRITTEN WHEN, AT JERUSALEM THE EGYPTIANS HAD PUT A PAPER ON THE TABLE AND THE ISRAELIS ALSO HAD. I THINK THAT YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER SAID, "GO DOWN TO YOUR HOTEL ROOM AND SEE IF YOU CAN PUT DOWN WHAT'S COMMON IN THESE TWO PAPERS. WHERE THERE'S DIVERGENCE, JUST MAKE TWO COLUMNS. GIVE US A WORKING DOCUMENT TO TALK FROM. THAT'S WHAT WE DID. THIS IS WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT NOW WHEN WE TALK ABOUT ADVANCING AMERICAN PLANS. I'M NOT QUITE SURE IN WHAT WAY WE MIGHT DO THAT, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT AT SOME POINT IT MAY WELL BE AND IT WOULD GROW OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REASON I GO THROUGH THIS LONG HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION IS THAT THERE WERE A COUPLE OF OTHER AMERICAN PLANS THAT WEREN'T LIKE THIS. THERE WAS A ROGERS PLAN ONCE, AND THERE WAS A BROOKINGS REPORT, AND THERE'VE BEEN A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS LIKE THAT. THEY WERE AMERICAN PAPERS DEVELOPED EITHER BY THE GOVERNMENT OR BY PRIVATE AMERICANS WITH

AMERICANS TALKING TO EACH OTHER. THEY WERE MADE IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY WERE NOT DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES. THAT IS A DIFFERENT KIND OF THING. THE BROOKINGS REPORT IS A PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE THING FOR A GROUP OF AMERICANS TO SIT DOWN AND WRITE. IT'S NOT A NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT AND IT'S NOT AN AMERICAN PLAN

IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE ON THE PARTIES. WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT A ROGERS PLAN, OR A BROOKINGS REPORT, OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT AN AMERICAN ROLE IN THE MIDST OF VERY ELABORATE NEGOTIATIONS, IDEAS ADVANCED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRYSTALLIZING THE NEGOTIATIONS, HELPING THE PARTIES FIND MIDDLE GROUND AND MOVING ON FROM THERE.

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Q. AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO THIS ONLY WHEN BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PROPER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF PROPOSAL?

A. SOMETIMES WE VOLUNTEER THINGS WITHOUT ASKING PERMISSION OF THE TWO SIDES. I CAN'T REALLY SAY UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD BE PUT FORWARD, BUT IN A CONVERSATION YOU THROW OUT AN IDEA VERBALLY AND THEN MAYBE LATER REDUCE IT TO WRITING. THERE'S A HOLE COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITIES HERE, BUT ESSENTIALLY YOU START WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT WE ARE THERE AT THE REQUEST OF BOTH SIDES TO HELP THEM FIND A MIDDLE GROUND. SO OUR MERE ROLE AND PRESENCE REFLECT THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE TWO SIDES THAT WE PLAY THIS ROLE, AND THE ROLE IS GOING TO INCLUDE IN THE FUTURE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, HELPING THEM FIND MIDDLE GROUND, BREAKING IMPASSES, PRODUCING USEFUL WORKING DRAFTS OR WHATEVER THE SITUATION DEMANDS. THAT SEEMS TO ME IN THE SPIRIT OF WHAT WE'VE BEEN ASKED TO DO.

Q. (UNCLEAR, BUT RELATES TO THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK).

A. MY VIEW OF THIS IS THAT WE'VE LOOKED AT THE WEST BANK PROBLEM AND REALIZED THE COMPLICATED ISSUES THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED THERE. FIRST OF ALL, THERE'S THE SECURITY ISSUE FOR ISRAEL. THAT HAS TWO PARTS, PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION, AND PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM. THEY'RE TWO DIFFERENT PROBLEMS BUT THEY BOTH COME UNDER THE HEADING OF SECURITY. THERE IS A QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY WILL EXIST IF ISRAEL RELINQUISHES OR RELEASES, OR RELAXES ITS CONTROL ON THAT TERRITORY. THERE IS THE QUESTION OF BEYOND THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITY, OF WHAT KIND OF LONG-TERM POLITICAL BODY WILL EXIST THERE AND HOW IT WILL RELATE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. THAT'S A QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP IT WILL HAVE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, WHAT THE LINES BETWEEN THEM ULTIMATELY WILL BE AND WHAT THE RE-

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LATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PEOPLE IN THOSE TERRI-

TORIES MIGHT BE. THESE THINGS ARE TOO COMPLICATED TO RESOLVE ALL IN ONE BASKET SO, WE CAME A YEAR AND A QUARTER AGO TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF TRANSITIONAL REGIME. EVERYBODY PRETTY MUCH AGREES WITH THAT. NOW YOUR GOVERNMENT PICKED IT UP IN THE SELF-RULE PLAN. SADAT HAS ADOPTED IT. I THINK THE JORDANIANS AND THE SAUDIS ALSO AGREE. THE PROBLEM WE HAVE TO RESOLVE HERE, IS TWO-FOLD: ONE IS HOW CAN YOU ASSURE THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS ARE MET IN THAT PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU'RE GOING TO GET WILLING ARAB PARTICIPANTS IN THAT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, THEY HAVE TO HAVE A SENSE THAT SOME OF THEIR OBJECTIVES WILL BE MET AT THE END OF THE PROCESS. IT DOESN'T SURPRISE ME THAT AT THIS STAGE IN THIS TRANSITIONAL PROCESS AND THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT COMMITTING ITSELF TO THE OUTCOME OF THAT PROCESS. I'M NOT SO SURE THAT AS ISRAEL BECOMES MORE ASSURED IT'S SECURITY NEEDS CAN BE MET, THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION MIGHT NOT EVOLVE ON THIS QUESTION WHICH IS OF CONCERN TO THE ARABS. THE QUESTION IS, WHAT'S THE DESTINATION OF THIS TRANSITIONAL PROCESS. I DON'T, IN ANY WAY, WANT TO INTERPRET THE DEBATE IN ISRAEL OVER THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT WE'VE POSED, BUT IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS ENTERING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN A SPIRIT THAT EVERY REASONABLE PROPOSAL IS NEGOTIABLE AND THAT IF NEW IDEAS ARE PUT ON THE TABLE THEY CAN BE DISCUSSED. ISRAEL HAS NOT TIED ITS HANDS FROM PERMITTING ITS OWN POSITION TO EVOLVE. BUT WE HAVE THIS BASIC PROBLEM TO RESOLVE, ISRAELI SECURITY ON THE ONE HAND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST BANK, AND THE QUESTION OF WHO CONTROLS THE TERRITORY ULTIMATELY. THOSE THINGS WILL HAVE TO GO AHEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SIDE-BY-SIDE.

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IF YOU HAVE TO RULE OUT ALL PROGRESS ON EITHER OF THOSE ISSUES, THEN YOU COULDNT HAVE A NEGOTIATION. I DON'T THINK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS DONE THAT. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT ALL PROPOSITIONS ARE NEGOTIABLE, BUT IT DOES NOT FIND THE EGYPTIAN PLAN AT THIS STAGE ACCEPTABLE, WHILE THE EGYPTIANS HAVE SAID IT DOESN'T FIND THE SELF-RULE PLAN AT THIS STAGE ACCEPTABLE. THAT'S WHAT HAPPENS AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEGOTIATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CABINET SPOKESMAN SAID THAT WHAT THAT MEANS IS THAT WE'RE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING. SO, NEGOTIATIONS CAN MOVE AHEAD.

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